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I. INTRODUCTION
"Is systematic genocide an internal matter or a matter for all
mankind?" This question, posed by a former minister of education
under Idi Amin,1 has yet to be answered. Although the concept is old,
crimes against humanity form a relatively new category addressed by
international law.' The war crimes trials which were prosecuted after
1. LEo KUPER, THE PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE 139 (1985).
2. G.I.A.D. Draper, The Development of International Humanitarian Law, in
INT'L DIMENSIONS OF HUMANITARIAN LAW 67 (UNESCO 1988). Draper traces hu-
manitarian law through the development of the law of war. Although early stages of
(193)
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the Second World War, and included charges of genocide, focused the
world's concern on humanitarian law.' Since that time there have been
several international conventions and United Nations resolutions that
address humanitarian issues." The terms of the various conventions are
limited, and principles that have evolved through international custom-
ary law may prove to be more useful in dealing with humanitarian
crises.
One of the earliest conventions, the 1948 Convention on the Pre-
vention and Punishment of Genocide,' was created in response to the
atrocities committed by the Nazis during World War 11.6 Genocidal
practices continue, however, and the 1948 Genocide Convention has
failed to prevent them or provide the means of punishment for such
actions.' Political tensions, principally between the United States and
the Soviet Union, prevented effective action against these atrocities.,
With little time to adjust to the post-Cold War atmosphere, the world
suddenly finds itself faced with blatant acts of genocide occurring in
the former Yugoslavian republic of Bosnia.9 As of September 1993, the
humanitarian law were apparent in the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907,
id. at 73, the inhumanity witnessed in World War II led to new innovations in humani-
tarian law such as the definition of war crimes. Id. at 79. The Genocide Convention
went beyond traditional humanitarian law by extending its scope beyond situations of
war. Id. at 80.
3. BRADLEY F. SMITH, THE ROAD TO NUREMBERG 3-4 (1981).
4. Most significant are the following: International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Jan. 4, 1969, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Jan. 3, 1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3;
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S.
171; and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Jan. 12, 1951, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. Also significant is
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
entered into force, Sept. 3, 1981, Hein's No. KAV 2757. See THEODORE MERON,
HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNAL STRIFE: THEIR INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 4-5 (1987).
5. Genocide Convention, supra note 4, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
6. KUPER, supra note 1, at 8.
7. Ethnic genocides have occurred in Tibet, Burundi and Iran; while political
genocides have occurred in Cambodia, Indonesia, and Uganda. See id. at 128-33, 157-
64.
8. Id. at 8. During the Cold War the Soviets deplored United Nations human
rights initiatives as impermissible intervention. Thomas M. Franck, Soviet Initiatives:
U.S. Responses New Opportunities For Reviving the United Nations System, 83 AM.
J. INT'L L. 531, 533 (1989). Under Gorbachev, the USSR changed its attitude, evi-
denced by a 1988 aide-memoire promoting United Nations action, including peace
keeping missions. Id. at 536. It remains to be seen whether Russia will continue this
trend.
9. See infra part II.B.
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conflict had resulted in an estimated 200,000 dead while another two
million had fled their homes.10 Without the severe ideological differ-
ences of the past, the world community should be capable of reacting
to crimes against humanity with as much unity as it did against aggres-
sion in the Persian Gulf War.1"
While the situation in Bosnia increasingly appears to be a case of
genocide,12 the Genocide Convention offers few practical solutions to
the problem of ending the tragedy. It treats genocide as a crime perpe-
trated by individuals,' 3 whereas most occurrences of genocide involve
10. Julia Elliott, Balkan atrocities stun Ottawa student; Croats' Massacre went
Unreported, Volunteer says, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Sept. 4, 1993, at C4.
11. Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, in her attack against the
world's passive stance towards Bosnia, referred to the collective effort to punish aggres-
sion in Kuwait. CBS This Morning: Interview with Margaret Thatcher (CBS television
broadcast, Apr. 14, 1993) transcript available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Script File.
The success of the Gulf War was possible because of the reduction in tensions between
the United States and the Soviet Union. President Bush described this state of affairs
by coining the term "new world order" which "refers to new ways of working with
other nations to deter aggression and to achieve stability, to achieve prosperity and,
above all, achieve peace." Don Oberdorfer, Bush's Talk of a 'New World Order'" For-
eign Policy Tool or Mere Slogan?, WASH. POST, May 26, 1991, at A3 1. Without the
end of the Cold War, the Soviet Union would have sided with Iraq, a long-time friend,
and used its veto in the Security Council to effectively prohibit collective action in the
Gulf. Ronald Steel, How did the Gulf War Change the World?, NEWSDAY, Nassau
and Suffolk Ed., July 28, 1991, Currents; Sunday Focus, at 29. It is also true, however,
that the world cared about Kuwait not out of concern for its people, but concern for its
oil. Id. In the former Yugoslavia, the Serbs have been trying to gain support from their
Orthodox Christian co-religionists in Russia, see Refugees Prevented from Leaving
Srebrenica, GAZETTE (Montreal), Apr. 7, 1993, at A8, but Russia has not blocked
United Nations sanctions and has assisted in humanitarian efforts. See Paul Lewis,
Struggle in the Balkans; Belgrade Facing Severe Isolation Under U.N. Moves, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 19, 1993, at Al. Russia did not even object when United States planes
operating under NATO authority shot down four Bosnian Serb planes which were vio-
lating the no-fly zone over Bosnia. John Lancaster, United States Jets Down 4 Serb
Bombers Over Bosnia: NA TO Says Pilots in 'No-Fly' Zone Were Warned, WASH.
POST, Mar. 1, 1994, at Al.
12. Bruce W. Nelan, More Harm than Good; Bosnia's Brutal Tragedy Grows
Worse while the U.S. and its Allies Resolve to Remain Spectators, TIME, Mar. 15,
1993, at 40. The author concludes that "Bosnia is effectively finished." Id. at 45. Even
Croatian soldiers are becoming more brutal in their assaults on Muslim towns. Rod
Nordland, 'Let's Kill the Muslims' Bosnia: An on-the-ground report of the brutal
massacre in Stupni Do, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 8, 1993, at 48.
13. Article VI refers to the punishment of "persons." Genocide Convention, supra
note 4, 78 U.N.T.S. at 280-81. Article V defines the only obligation on nations: to
enact legislation forbidding genocide, and to extradite offenders found within their bor-
ders. Id. at 280. The only reference to international responsibility is in article VIII
which allows signatory nations to seek action from the UN to punish or prevent geno-
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state action.14 Also, the Convention can only bind signatory nations to
the extent that they agree to its terms.15 Therefore, in determining
what constitutes legal action against a nation, it is necessary to ex-
amine whether international customary law obliges nations to refrain
from acts of genocide and permits an outside response to violations.
The competing principle of state sovereignty, especially the subordinate
doctrine of non-intervention in a state's internal matters, adds another
layer to the analysis."0 If, however, genocide is not an internal matter,
then the principle of non-intervention does not apply. Recent General
Assembly and Security Council resolutions characterizing apartheid,17
the Kurdish situation in Iraq,18 and now the crisis in Bosnia19 as threats
to world peace indicate a growing recognition of the international na-
ture of grave human rights violations. This Comment examines the sit-
uation in Bosnia and the legal principles that shape the available
options.
II. GENOCIDE IN BOSNIA
The horror of the Holocaust during World War II caused Raphael
Lemkin to campaign for an international convention focussing on geno-
cide separately from other crimes against humanity. He coined the
term "genocide" 20 and defined it in the following way:
Generally speaking, genocide does not necessarily mean the im-
cide. Id. at 282.
14. See Mark Huber, Why the Genocide Treaty Trivializes the Horror of Geno-
cide, HERITAGE FOUND. REP., Feb. 14, 1986, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
NWLTRS File.
15. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES, § 321 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
16. PETER MACALISTER-SMITH, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE: Dis-
ASTER RELIEF ACTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION 70 (1985). Do-
mestic jurisdiction has never been defined by international law. M.S. RAJAN, THE Ex-
PANDING JURISDICTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS 2 (1982). The consensus among
nations at the time of the League of Nations and now is that what constitutes internal
affairs must be decided on a case by case basis depending on the state of international
law at the time. Id. at 2, 168-69.
17. G.A. Res. 34/93A, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46 at 29, U.N. Doc.
A/34/46 (1979). For text see infra note 159.
18. S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2982nd mtg. at 31, U.N. Doc. S/
INF/46 (1991). For text see infra note 161.
19. S.C. Res. 771, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3106th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/771
(1992); S.C. 787, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3137th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/787
(1992). For text see infra note 163.
20. KUPER, supra note 1, at 9.
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mediate destruction of a nation, except when accomplished by
mass killings of all members of a nation. It is intended rather to
signify a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the de-
struction of essential foundations of the life of national groups,
with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves. The objec-
tives of such a plan would be the disintegration of the political
and social institutions, of culture, language, national feelings,
religion, and the economic existence of national groups, and the
destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and
even the lives of the individuals belonging to such groups. Ge-
nocide is directed against the national group as an entity, and
the actions involved are directed against individuals, not in their
individual capacity, but as members of the national group."
By contrast, the Convention's definition is very ambiguous, providing
only a vague concept of genocide followed by examples of acts deemed
to be illustrative of the crime. Article II states:
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following
acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of
the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole
or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within
the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another
group."
On the other hand, when giving its consent to the ratification of the
Convention, the United States Senate declared its understandings con-
cerning the definition of genocide:
(1) That the term "intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial, or religious group as such" appearing
in Article II means the specific intent to destroy in whole or in
part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group as such by
21. Id.
22. Genocide Convention, supra note 4, 78 U.N.T.S. at 280.
1993]
198 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE [Vol. 17
the acts specified in Article II.
(2) That the term "mental harm" in Article 11(b) means per-
manent impairment of mental faculties through drugs, torture,
or similar techniques.
(4) That acts in the course of armed conflicts committed with-
out the specific intent required by Article II are not sufficient to
constitute genocide as defined by this Convention.23
A study of the situation in Bosnia reveals a pattern of conduct that is
clearly within the parameters of genocide as defined in both of the
above definitions.
A. Background of the Bosnian Conflict
The crisis in Bosnia can be traced back to the third century A.D.
when the Byzantine and Roman empires split.24 Bosnia sits on what
was the line of division between the two empires, where the ethnic cul-
tures meet. 26 After the split, the versions of Christianity in the east and
west differed: the east followed what is known today as the Eastern
Orthodox tradition, and the German expansion in the west left that
area mostly Catholic.26 Later, the Ottoman empire strongly influenced
the east, resulting in the Muslim population in Bosnia.2 '
The Serbs feel they are victims of past aggression by both the
Catholics and Muslims.2 8 The Ottoman empire took control of Serbia
in 1389 and subjected Serbs to massacres and serfdom.2 9 The Serbs
finally threw out the Turks early in the 19th century. During World
War II, the puppet Nazi government in Croatia executed hundreds of
thousands of Serbs.31 After World War II, these ethnic divisions were
subdued under the Communist rule of President Tito. 2 Unfortunately,
Tito allowed the ethnic divisions to fester by not prosecuting war
23. 132:15 CONG. REC. S1378 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1986) (emphasis added). See
generally id. for the Senate discussion on ratifying the Genocide Convention.
24. Roger Cohen, Cross vs. Crescent; The Battle Lines Are Being Redrawn in
Bosnia Along Old Religious Scars, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1992, at A14.
25. Id.
26. The Eagle's Curse, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Aug. 9, 1992, Features.
27. Cohen, supra note 24, at A14.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. The Eagle's Curse, supra note 26.
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criminals and by forbidding anyone to discuss the events of World War
11.3- With the death of Tito in 1980, and the later fall of the Soviet
Union, old rivalries resurfaced. 4
After the fall of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia attempted to negoti-
ate a satisfactory government for all six republics (Slovenia, Croatia,
Serbia, Bosnia, Montenegro, and Macedonia), 3 5 but the negotiations
for a loose, non-Serb controlled federation failed in the Spring of
1991.36 Aware that the United States and the European Community
supported territorial integrity, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic
felt no need to compromise.3" Instead, the Serbian leadership refused to
agree to a non-Serb controlled federation and "had the central army
declare martial law, a move that had been explicitly ruled out by the
federal presidency, which acted, or should have acted, as commander in
chief."3 8 Then, in May 1991, Croatia and Slovenia declared indepen-
dence after the federal council defeated the election of a Croat, Stipe
Mesic, who should have become president "under the constitutional ar-
rangements of the federation." 9 Federal armed forces responded in
Slovenia with military attacks on June 27, 1991.40
The Bosnian parliament voted for independence on October 15,
1991. 4' It was not until March 1, 1992, however, that Bosnia finally
garnered the necessary two-thirds popular support for independence in
a republic-wide referendum."2 Bosnia then proceeded to seek United
Nations membership, strongly supported by the United States and Eu-
rope.43 Violence broke out later that month when the Bosnian Serbs
repudiated the Statement of Principles for New Constitutional Ar-
33. Nancy Nusser, Never Again? Old Hatreds Fuel the Killing, THE ATLANTIC J.
AND CONST., Nov. 19, 1992, at A19.
34. Id.; The Eagle's Curse, supra note 26.
35. Marc Weller, Current Development: The International Response to the Disso-
lution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 569 (1992).
36. Id. Serb leadership previously dominated Bosnia. Id.
37. Id. at 570.
38. Id.
39. Id. His election was blocked by Serbia, Montenegro, and the two autonomous
republics. Id.
40. Id.
41. Timothy Heritage, Bosnia Moves Toward Independence in Fresh Blow to Yu-
goslavia, REUTERS, Oct. 15, 1991, PM cycle, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Wires File, cited in John Webb, Comment, Genocide Treaty-Ethnic Cleans-
ing-Substantive and Procedural Hurdles in the Application of the Genocide Conven-
tion to Alleged Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia, 23 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 377
(1993).
42. Weller, supra note 35, at 593, 596.
43. Id. at 596-97.
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rangements that the Croats, Muslims, and Serbs had worked out just
ten days earlier." The Bosnian Serbs preferred to remain part of Yu-
goslavia and, aided by Serbian forces and air power, initiated armed
attacks against Bosnian Muslims.4 5 The fighting quickly escalated,
causing Bosnia to declare a state of emergency and appeal to the Euro-
pean Community to prevent aggression by the Serbs.46 The European
Community called for a cease-fire and acceptance of the Statement of
Principles, 47 but the violence continued despite repeated attempts to ne-
gotiate cease-fires.48 Marrack Goulding, a United Nations representa-
tive, went to Bosnia in late April, 1992, and determined that there was
little hope for a workable cease-fire. 49 He also confirmed reports of in-
tentional efforts by the Serbs to impose ethnic purification on regions of
Bosnia.50
B. The Current Situation in Bosnia
The very term "ethnic cleansing," the euphemism used by the
Serbs, implies genocide. The early reports described forced expulsions
of Muslims in sealed train cars." As the fighting escalated, the Serbs
destroyed Bosnian towns, beating, mutilating, or conducting mass
murders of the Muslim residents.5 The Serbs dealt with those Muslims
not massacred by sending them to detention camps or forcing them to
flee their homes after signing over their property.53 Often the Serbs
44. Id. at 597.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 598-601.
49. Id. at 601.
50. Id. at 601-02. Goulding confirmed that Bosnian Serbs, aided by the Yugoslav
National Army (JNA) were using military force and intimidation to create ethnically
pure regions. Id.
51. Karen Breslau, The Push for National 'Purity', NEWSWEEK, Aug. 3, 1992, at
36.
52. See id. at 37; Weller, supra note 35, at 602; Nusser, supra note 33, at A19.
For example, after the surrender of the town of Biscani, the Serbs forced the male
residents to lie on the asphalt and then they beat them. In another incident, one hun-
dred women were called to the center of the town and told to disperse. While leaving,
they were shot in the back. At another town the Serbs randomly called names from a
list and killed those named. Supplemental United States Submission of Information to
the United Nations Security Council, 3 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, Nov. 2, 1992, at 802, 803
[hereinafter Supplemental Report].
53. Breslau, supra note 51, at 36-37; Andrej Gustincic, Serb Police Chief Sees
His Mission to Fight Islam, REUTERS, LTD., Aug. 17, 1992, PM Cycle, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
GENOCIDE CONVENTION
have massacred Muslims attempting to flee,5 ' as well as those Muslims
captured and detained at camps.5 5 Muslims who had been prisoners
also report that the Serbs are severely torturing detainees by, for exam-
ple, forcing them to run a gauntlet of gun fire in order to reach the
dining areas. 6
Recent reports have surfaced of massive "rape camps" filled with
Muslim girls and women who are systematically and viciously raped by
Serbian soldiers and held captive until they die or become visibly preg-
nant with unwanted Serbian children.5 7 The European Community in-
vestigation estimated that as many as 20,000 Muslim women have been
systematically raped.55
The specific intent to destroy the Muslim people and culture in
Bosnia is apparent. Generally, Serbs speak of stopping the spread of
what they call Islamic fundamentalism. 9 They ignore the fact that
Bosnian Muslims only recently have turned to fundamentalism in the
face of the Serbian attacks."' Religious symbols such as mosques have
been targeted."1 By the end of July, thirty-seven Imams, Muslim cler-
54. Supplemental Report, supra note 52, at 805.
55. The detention camps are not unlike the concentration camps of Nazi Ger-
many. One survivor reported that while two to three hundred prisoners were held in
one room made of sheet metal at Keraterm camp, the room was gassed. When the
prisoners broke out to escape the gas, they were met with gunfire, which was also di-
rected at those still inside. Third United States Submission of Information to the
United Nations Security Council, 3 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, Nov. 16, 1992, at 825, 826
[hereinafter Third Report].
56. Id.
57. Tom Post, A Pattern of Rape, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 4, 1993, at 32-36. Escaped
Muslim women report being told, "When we let you go home you'll have to give birth
to a Chetnik [Serbian extremist]. We won't let you go while you can have an abor-
tion." Third Report, supra note 55, at 830.
58. EC Report on Rape in Yugoslavia Submitted to U.N., REUTER EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY REP., Jan. 26, 1993, BC Cycle, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires
File. The investigators reached their estimate through the use of statistical data and
medical records provided by hospitals, and through testimony of victims and medical
experts in the area. U.N. Finds Evidence of Large-Scale Rape in Yugoslavia, REUTER
LIaR. REP., Jan. 29, 1993, BC Cycle available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
The Report stated that "[s]olid evidence was found that Croatian, Moslem and Serbian
women have been detained for extended periods of time and repeatedly raped," al-
though it also added that the majority of rape victims were Bosnian Muslims. Id.
59. A Serbian police chief described his mission as protecting Europe from Islam,
telling a reporter, "[w]hat Europe has done is slyly put Serbia in the position of again
defending it from Islam." Gustincic, supra note 53.
60. See Cohen, supra note 24, at A14; The Eagle's Curse, supra note 26.
61. It is estimated that 650 mosques have been destroyed since the outbreak of
violence in Bosnia. Gustav Niebuhr, Top Clerics Plea for End to Brutalities in Bosnia,
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ics, were reported to have been murdered.62 The Serbian Militiamen
commonly refer to Muslims as filth,6" and they say they plan to con-
tinue fighting until all Muslims convert or are destroyed." Crosses
have been engraved on the foreheads of Muslim internees. 65 Serbs mur-
dered Muslim patients at the medical center in Zvornik in order to
make room for wounded Serbian soldiers.66 Infants and children were
among the many patients slaughtered while the Muslim doctors were
forced to watch. 7 Some captured Serbian soldiers claimed that while
serving as soldiers they were ordered by their superiors to rape Muslim
women to degrade and humiliate them.68 One member of the European
Community investigation team described a Serbian "systematic will to
humiliate a community, and thereby force it to leave."69
Even if only some of these reports are true,70 it is clear that the
Serbs are carrying out specific acts designed to degrade, expel, and
murder Muslims because of their membership in a religious group.
These acts are evidence of a "coordinated plan" to destroy the Muslim
culture directed at the Muslims as an "entity."' 7" Several of the acts
listed in the Genocide Convention are occurring, including killing mem-
bers of the group, intentionally causing mental harm through mass
rape and torture, and subjecting the Muslim people to conditions calcu-
lated to cause physical harm.72 These actions, combined with the intent
expressed by the Serbs themselves, indicate a clear policy of genocide.
Such acts are not mitigated by the allegations of Muslim atrocities
WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 1992, at D10. See also Karen Detling, Comment, Eternal Si-
lence: The Destruction of Cultural Property in Yugoslavia, 17 MD. J. INT'L L. &
TRADE 41 (1993).
62. Supplemental Report, supra note 52, at 804.
63. John F. Burns, Under Siege: A Muslim Family Survives, with Fear and
Grace, in Sarajevo, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1992, at A12.
64. Id.
65. Third Report, supra note 55, at 829.
66. Id. at 828.
67. Id.
68. Post, supra note 57, at 34. One victim reported being told by a Serbian sol-
dier, "Have orders to rape the girls. I am ashamed to be a Serb. Everything that is
going on is a war crime." Third Report, supra note 55, at 831.
69. EC Report on Rape in Yugoslavia Submitted to U.N., supra note 58.
70. Some Serbs believe the reporting is one sided and exaggerated to justify even-
tual intervention by foreign forces. Branko Miliakeric, Bosnia-Hercegovenia: Serb An-
ger at "Rape Camp" Claims, INTER PRESS, Jan. 6, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Wires File.
71. See Lempkin's definition, supra note 21 and accompanying text.
72. Genocide Convention, supra note 4, art. II, 78 U.N.T.S. at 280.
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against Serbs both recently and earlier, whether true or not.7" Even
assuming the Serbian genocidal acts were committed in self-defense of
Muslim violations of international law, "self-help measures against the
offending state many not include measures against the state's nationals
that are contrary to the principles governing human rights and the
treatment of foreign nationals. 74
III. CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE
CRIME OF GENOCIDE
7 5
After witnessing the Nazi atrocities during World War II, the
world vowed, "never again." In an attempt to prevent future acts of
genocide, the United Nations issued a resolution declaring that geno-
cide is an international crime.76 The Convention on the Prevention and
73. In March, 1992, Serbs appealed to the United Nations and European Com-
munity to stop Croatian support of Bosnian paramilitary activities. Jonathan S.
Landay, Bosnia Serbs Accuse Croats and Muslims of "Aggression," PROPRIETARY TO
THE UNITED PRESS INT'L, Mar. 26, 1992, Int'l Section, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Wires File. British Serbs have also organized a museum displaying photo-
graphs of Serbian victims of Muslim atrocities both recently and from World War II.
Mary Braid, Serbs Defy UK Ban on "Atrocities" Exhibition, INDEPENDENT, Feb. 26,
1993, at 2. After the European Commission issued its report on Bosnian rapes, the
Serbs supplied their own list of Muslim and Croat rape camps. Miliakeric, supra note
70.
74. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 15, § 905 cmt. b.
75. Genocide Convention, supra note 4, 78 U.N.T.S. at 277.
76. Genocide is a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups, as
homicide is the denial of the right to live of individual human beings; such
denial of the right of existence shocks the conscience of mankind, results in
great losses to humanity in the form of cultural and other contributions repre-
sented by these human groups, and is contrary to moral law and to the spirit
and aims of the United Nations.
Many instances of such crimes of genocide have occurred when racial, reli-
gious, political and other groups have been destroyed, entirely or in part.
The punishment of the crime of genocide is a matter of international concern.
The General Assembly, therefore,
Affirms that genocide is a crime under international law which the civilized
world condemns, and for the commission of which principals and accom-
plices-whether private individuals, public officials or statesmen, and whether
the crime is committed on religious, racial, political or any other
grounds-are punishable;
Invites the Member States to enact the necessary legislation for the preven-
tion and punishment of this crime;
Recommends that international co-operation be organized between States
with a view to facilitating the speedy prevention and punishment of the crime
of genocide, and, to this end,
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Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was completed in 1948 and en-
tered into force in 1951.7 As with all treaties, the Convention only
applies to the signatory parties.7 8 Differences in the drafters' ideologies
led to compromises on acts against political groups, universal jurisdic-
tion, and preventive measures.79 These compromises weaken the
treaty's effectiveness. Moreover, the force of the treaty as a symbol of
the world's moral outrage at acts of genocide was diminished by the
refusal of the United States to ratify the treaty until 1988, and then
only with reservations.8"
A. The Provisions of the Genocide Convention
The Genocide Convention begins by defining genocide and then
Requests the Economic and Social Council to undertake the necessary stud-
ies, with a view to drawing up a draft convention on the crime of genocide to
be submitted to the next regular session of the General Assembly.
G.A. Res. 96(I), U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1 at 188 (1946). This resolution was passed
unanimously. 1 UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS: RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GEN-
ERAL ASSEMBLY; 1947-1948 xxvii (1973).
77. Genocide Convention, supra note 4, 78 U.N.T.S. at 277. Entry into force was
triggered "on the ninetieth day following the date of deposit of the twentieth instru-
ment of ratification or accession." Id. art. XIII, 78 U.N.T.S. at 284.
78. The parties to the Convention include: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Anti-
gua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados,
Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Repub-
lic, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czecho-
slovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland,
France, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Federal Republic of Germany,
Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, Ire-
land, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Republic
of Korea, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Maldives, Mali, Mex-
ico, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland,
Romania, Rwanda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Spain,
Sri Lanka, Sweden, Syria, Tanzania, Togo, Tonga, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukranian Soviet
Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United
States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen (Aden), Yemen (Sanaa), Yugoslavia,
Zaire, Zimbabwe. TREATIES IN FORCE - JANUARY 1992 329 (1992).
79. For a discussion of these compromises, see infra part III.C.
80. The United States delayed ratifying the Genocide Convention for two main
reasons. First, the United States feared that other nations would use the Convention to
harass it by bringing frivolous suits against the United States in the International
Court of Justice. See Huber, supra note 14. Second, the United States felt that the
Convention was full of loopholes. Id. For a discussion of the reservations see 132:15
CONG. REC. S1355-81 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1986); Marian Nash Leich, Protection of
Human Rights, 80 AM. J. INT'L. L. 612 (1986).
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includes within the definition of genocide such acts as conspiracy, in-
citement, attempts, and complicity. 1 Article IV specifies that all indi-
viduals, including government officials, are liable for acts of genocide.8 2
The Convention also obligates signatory nations to legislate against ge-
nocide,8" to prosecute offenders in national or international courts,84
and to extradite alleged offenders to countries with jurisdiction." Fi-
nally, the Convention allows a contracting party to seek recourse from
the United Nations86 and dispute resolution in the International Court
of Justice. 87
B. The Binding Nature of the Genocide Convention
Although Yugoslavia was a signatory to the Genocide Convention,
the breakaway republics do not necessarily remain parties. 8 In its pre-
liminary order concerning the situation in Bosnia, the International
Court of Justice found that there was a basis upon which the Court
might exercise jurisdiction over both Rump Yugoslavia (Serbia and
81. Genocide Convention, supra note 4, arts. II, III, 78 U.N.T.S. at 280.
82. Id. art. IV, 78 U.N.T.S. at 280.
83. Id. art. V, 78 U.N.T.S. at 280.
84. Id. art. VI, 78 U.N.T.S. at 280-82.
85. Id. art. VII, 78 U.N.T.S. at 282.
86. Id. art. VIII, 78 U.N.T.S. at 282.
87. Id. art. IX, 78 U.N.T.S. at 282.
88. Under customary international law, a new nation cannot automatically be
bound by the treaties of the predecessor nation. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 15,
§ 210(3). However, the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Trea-
ties (Vienna Convention), once in force, will change that custom. Although the Vienna
Convention is not in force, Yugoslavia signed and ratified the Vienna Convention, and
is thereby bound not to undermine the objective of this Convention. See Vienna Con-
vention of the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 18, 8 I.L.M. 679, 686. The Vienna
Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties states:
(1) When a part or parts of the territory of a State separate to form one or
more States, whether or not the predecessor State continues to exist:
(a) any treaty in force at the date of the succession of States in
respect of the entire territory of the predecessor State continues in
force in respect of each successor State so formed.
Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, Aug. 22, 1978, art.
34(1), 17 I.L.M. 1488, 1509. Additionally:
When, after separation of any part of the territory of a State, the predecessor
State continues to exist, any treaty which at the date of the succession of
States was in force in respect of the predecessor State continues in force in
respect of its remaining territory unless:
(a) the States concerned otherwise agree;
(b) it is established that the treaty related only to the territory
which has separated from the predecessor State; or
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Montenegro) and Bosnia under the Genocide Convention."' The Court
noted that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, composed of Serbia and
Montenegro, issued a declaration stating that "[tihe Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, continuing the State, international legal and political
personality of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, shall
strictly abide by all the commitments that the Socialist Federal Repub-
lic of Yugoslavia assumed internationally."' 0 Also, while Yugoslavia
disputed Bosnia's ability to accede unilaterally (essentially add itself as
a party) to the Genocide Convention by filing a notice of succession on
December 29, 1992, the Court did not accept the validity of that argu-
ment. 1 The Court noted that the Secretary-General of the United Na-
tions treated Bosnia's notice as a succession, or inheritance (as opposed
to an accession). The Court further commented that even if Bosnia had
attempted to accede to the Genocide Convention, the necessary 90 day
period for objection to an acceding party required under articles XI
and XIII of the Genocide Convention had passed.92
C. The Weaknesses of the Genocide Convention
The Genocide Convention is thus relevant because it is binding
upon all of former Yugoslavia. However, the Convention was subject to
compromises, and the result is therefore an ambiguous and weak
document.
The first compromise of the Genocide Convention concerns the
question of political groups. Soviet bloc countries strongly opposed the
inclusion of political groups in the Genocide Convention's definition of
(c) it appears from the treaty or is otherwise established that the
application of the treaty in respect of the predecessor State would be
incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty or would rad-
ically change the conditions for its operation.
Id. art. 35, at 1509.
Taken together, these two sections of the Vienna Convention dictate that all of the
former Yugoslavia is bound by treaties to which Yugoslavia was a party. The first
section applies to all territories, whether or not the predecessor continues as a sovereign
state. The latter section applies where, as Serbia claims, the predecessor State contin-
ues to exist. In both situations the treaties remain in force, and all the republics are
bound.
89. Order on Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures in Case Concern-
ing Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), 32
I.L.M. 888, 896 (1993).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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genocide. 3 As a result, although the United Nations resolution, which
passed unanimously only two years before the drafting of the Genocide
Convention, defines the elimination of political groups as genocidal, the
Convention does not. 9' This omission was more important in the situa-
tions in Cambodia, Indonesia and Uganda than it is in Yugoslavia.95
However, one of the reasons the United States hesitated to ratify the
Genocide Convention was that it did not address the likely genocides
against political groups."
A second weakness in the Genocide Convention is the lack of uni-
versal jurisdiction. Although some authorities view genocide as a crime
with universal jurisdiction,97 the Convention grants jurisdiction only to
the State where the acts took place or to a tribunal whose jurisdiction
is accepted by both parties.9 8 This lack of universal jurisdiction is a
serious flaw because most genocides are state-sponsored, and victims
can hardly expect to obtain relief from their own guilty government."
93. HUBER, supra note 14.
94. KUPER, supra note 1, at 126.
95. These were all situations involving "genocide" against political enemies. See
id. at 126-47.
96. See 132:15 CONG. REC. S1355 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1986) (comments of Sena-
tor Symms). Note that the enabling legislation known as the Proxmire Act, also omits
"political." Proxmire Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (1988).
97. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 15, § 404, reporters' note 1; Attorney
General for the Government of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5, 10 (1968). Genocide is
generally committed by governments, and governments are unlikely to punish them-
selves. With universal jurisdiction, more places would be available in which to. seek
justice.
98. Genocide Convention, supra note 4, art. VI, 78 U.N.T.S. at 280-82.
99. The whole Convention is based on the assumption of virtuous Govern-
ments and criminal individuals, a reversal of the truth .... In any event even
if this assumption were correct, the criminal law of every civilized State pro-
vides sufficiently against individual acts of the kind which are enumerated in
the Convention . . . . Thus, the Convention is unnecessary where it can be
applied and inapplicable where it may be necessary .... In the absence of
means to make it effective, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide joins all the pacts and international declarations,
which, for lack of enforcement provisions, remain pure show and all contain
the mental reservation; "unless contrary to the higher interests of the State, of
which the State is sole judge."
U.N., Study of Genocide, at 118-19, quoted in KUPER, supra note 1, at 17-18. Never-
theless, the surviving Bosnian government in Sarajevo has tried and convicted two Bos-
nian Serb soldiers for genocide. David Ottoway, Bosnia Convicts Two Serbs in War
Crimes Trial; U.N. Officer Seeks Amnesty to Promote Peace, WASH. POST, Mar. 31,
1993, at A21. Both were sentenced to death. id. The U.N. military commander in
Bosnia strongly condemned these trials, convinced that such trials should be held
before an international tribunal. Id.
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Yet lawyers offering solutions under the Convention have focused on
the ability of Bosnia, or escaped Bosnians, eventually to hold genocide
trials.10 0 Outside nations, then, are restricted to assisting in the collec-
tion of evidence, as opposed to directly trying to curb the atrocities
themselves.10 1 Jurisdiction is the clearest example of how the Conven-
tion suffers from its treatment of genocide as an individual act, instead
of as a government policy.
Finally, the Convention proposes no preventative measures, al-
though signatory nations are permitted to appeal to the United Nations
for appropriate measures to control genocidal acts. 02 Bosnia has
brought Yugoslavia before the International Court of Justice. The
Court has only issued a provisional order which, while not deciding the
merits of the case, asks Yugoslavia to "take all measures within its
power to prevent commission of the crime of genocide" and to ensure
that any armed forces supported by it do not commit acts of geno-
100. "Bosnia is now a sovereign country.... It is perfectly possible under the
Genocide Convention for Bosnia now to put together its own tribunal to try individuals
for acts of genocide." Interview with David Scheffer, a senior associate and lawyer at
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington (NPR radio broad-
cast, Aug. 9, 1992), transcript available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Script File. The
United States has sought to promote an international tribunal to try war criminals
from the Bosnian crisis, and has even prepared a list of those it believes should be tried.
Elaine Sciolino, U.S. Names Figures it Wants Charged with War Crimes, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 17, 1992, at Al. International pressure for such a tribunal is also strong. David
Todd, Pressure Mounts for a War-Crimes Tribunal; Canada is in the Vanguard of a
Move to Set Up an Unprecedented Panel to Deal with Atrocities in the Former Yugo-
slavia, GAZETTE (Montreal), Feb. 20, 1993, at B3. The United Nations finally passed a
resolution to set up such a tribunal, intended to try war criminals from all sides. S.C.
Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993);
Anthony Goodman, U.N. Decides to Set Up Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal, REUTER
LIBR. REP., Feb. 22, 1993, BC Cycle, available in, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
Even supporters of the tribunal admit, however, that the prosecution may only be able
to make war criminals "prisoners in their own countries, subject to arrest if they ever
travel abroad." Nordland, supra note 12, at 51. Both resistance from forces who con-
trol areas where atrocities have occurred, and poor funding by the Security Council
have hampered investigatory activity. Id.
101. The War Crimes Commission is compiling reported accounts, identifying vic-
tims, criminals, and witnesses, to use as evidence in eventual war crimes trials before
an international tribunal. Goodman, supra note 100. However, critics accuse the West
of using the war crimes tribunal as "a substitute for real action to control the crimes."
Nordland, supra note 12, at 51 quoting Muhamed Sacirbey, Bosnia's ambassador to
the United Nations. Both Denmark and Germany, however, have gone further and
brought criminal charges against alleged war criminals discovered within their borders.
ABC World News Tonight (ABC, Inc., Feb. 18, 1994) transcript available in LEXIS,.
Nexis Library, Script File.
102. Genocide Convention, supra note 4, art. VIII, 78 U.N.T.S. at 282.
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cide. 10 3 A few months later the Court issued a second statement de-
manding an "immediate and effective implementation" of its provi-
sional order.104 While the statement may push the United Nations
Security Council to respond more effectively to the Bosnian crisis, its
very necessity demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the Court's initial
order."0 5
While all former Yugoslavian republics are bound by the Genocide
Convention, the Convention itself is of little use. It obligates nations to
control genocidal acts within their borders, and the republics do not
seem willing or able to do this. The remaining Bosnians may only seek
justice through their own courts or an international tribunal when the
armed conflict is resolved. 106 Even then it may prove difficult. For ex-
ample, only with international protection were the Kurds able to sur-
vive their oppression and gather Iraqi documents with which they hope
to prosecute a case of genocide before the International Court of
Justice.10 7
103. See Order on Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures in Case
Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)),
32 I.L.M. 888, 901 (1993).
104. Stephen Kinzer, World Court Presses Belgrade on Genocide Issue, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 14, 1993, at A5.
105. Id.
106. The Bosnian government in Sarajevo has managed to try and convict two
Serbian soldiers. See discussion supra note 99. Also, the Bosnians filed a claim of geno-
cide against Serbia in the International Court of Justice. See case cited supra note 103
and accompanying text. In an unexpected unanimous opinion, the Court severely criti-
cized Serbia's role as instigator of the violence, and ordered Rump Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro) to "take all measures within its power to prevent commission of the
crime of genocide." Bosnia and Herzogovina v. Yugo. (Serbia and Montenegro), 32
I.L.M. at 901. The Russian Judge dissented only to the part of the opinion calling on
Serbia to prevent any military forces associated with it from committing acts of geno-
cide. Id. at 902. The Bosnians had hoped that the Court would find that Bosnia has a
right to receive arms from other nations to defend itself, but the Court ignored the
issue in its emergency opinion. Andrew Kelley, World Court Orders Serbia to Prevent
Genocide in Bosnia, REUTERS LIBR. REP., Apr. 8, 1993, BC Cycle, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File. Serbia denied any role in the Bosnian civil war. Id.;
Andrew Kelley, Serbia Rejects Bosnia's Genocide Charges in World Court, REUTERS
LIBR. REP., Apr. 2, 1993, BC Cycle, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
The lack of respect for the preliminary order was apparent even to the International
Court of Justice, which issued a second order in September, 1993, demanding compli-
ance with its original order. Kinzer, supra note 104, at AS.
107. Judith Miller, A Case of Genocide, Files Captured by Rebels Outline Sad-
dam Hussein's Murderous Campaign against Iraq's Four Million Kurds, OTTAWA
CITIZEN, Jan. 9, 1993, at B5.
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D. Going Beyond the Convention
There is no provision in the Convention that excludes available
remedies under customary law, so these options may also be consid-
ered.1"8 However, if genocide is strictly an internal matter, the custom-
ary principle of sovereignty, as well as the United Nations Charter,
limits the actions that may be taken even by the United Nations. 109
The concept of "sovereignty" implies "freedom of states from external
dominance in the determinance of their domestic and foreign policies
and the equality of states under law." 1 0 The idea of domestic jurisdic-
tion, which traditionally included human rights,' is codified in the
United Nations Charter.' 12
Two approaches are available to legitimize international action to
stop extreme humanitarian violations. The first approach examines the
evolution of genocide in customary international law. Through its ac-
tions and statements, the world community has demonstrated a recog-
nition that genocide can easily take on international proportions., 13 If
genocide is an international concern, a world response is not interven-
tion into the domestic affairs of a state. The second approach follows
the evolution of the doctrine of non-intervention. This doctrine has al-
ways had exceptions,11 and recently many observers have advocated
recognition of a new exception in the face of humanitarian violations. 5
The main difference between these two approaches is in the justifica-
tion for international action. In the former, world action is justified be-
108. THEODORE MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUS-
TOMARY LAW 229-30 (1989). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 15,
§ 703(1) cmt. a.
109. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic ju-
risdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to
settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the
application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
U. N. CHARTER art. 2, 7.
110. Jost Delbruck, Commentary on International Law: A Fresh Look at Human-
itarian Intervention under the Authority of the United Nations, 67 IND. L. J. 887, 889
(1992).
111. RAJAN, supra note 16, at 168.
112. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 1 7. For text of paragraph see supra note 109.
113. See infra parts IV.B. & IV.C.
114. See infra note 179 and accompanying text.
115. See Richard Lillich, Humanitarian Intervention. A Reply to Ian Brownlie
and a Plea for Constructive Alternatives, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN
WORLD, 229-51 (1974); Ved P. Nanda, Tragedies in Northern Iraq, Liberia, Yugosla-
via, and Haiti-Revisiting the Validity of Humanitarian Intervention Under Interna-
tional Law-Part I, 20 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 305 (1992).
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cause genocide has an international impact outside domestic jurisdic-
tion. Alternatively, under the latter approach, the action is
acknowledged as intervention, but justified under a public policy of
preventing massacres on the scale of genocide.116
IV. GENOCIDE IN CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
While the Genocide Convention treats genocide as an internal
matter to be controlled by the state, it does not represent the entirety of
international law on the subject. Even before the Convention was in
existence there was some evidence of "humanitarian intervention on be-
half of populations persecuted in a manner shocking to mankind."' 17
More recently, some nations have acted on the presumption that geno-
cide is not merely an internal, domestic matter.11 8 These actions may
point to principles of international law not embedded in the Genocide
Convention.
Certain state practices may evolve into customary international
law.119 Although it is not always clear when a practice has become
custom, there are two recognized criteria. The first criterion is the
manifestation of a general and consistent practice among a significant
number of states. 20 The second criterion is evidence that the states
follow the practice out of a sense of legal obligation (opinio juris).'2'
Once a custom is recognized, it is binding upon all nations, even those
who enter the international community after the custom is recognized
116. Oscar Schachter, The Rights of States to Use Force, MICH. L. R. 1620,
1628-29 (1984).
117. LEO KUPER, GENOCIDE: ITS POLITICAL USE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
19-20 (1981).
In 1827, England, France and Russia had intervened to end the atrocities in
the Greco-Turkish war. In 1840, the President of the United States, through
his Secretary of State, intervened with the Sultan of Turkey on behalf of the
persecuted Jews of Damascus and Rhodes. The French intervened to check
religious atrocities in Lebanon in 1861. There were protests by various nations
to the governments of Russia and Romania with respect to pogroms and
atrocities against the Jews, and to the government of Turkey on behalf of the
persecuted Christian minorities.
Id.
118. See infra part IV.B.
119. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 15, § 102 (2).
120. MERON, supra note 108, at 3. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 15,
§ 102(2).
121. MERON, supra note 108, at 3. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 15,
§ 102(2). See also Arthur M. Weisburd, Customary International Law: The Problem
of Treaties, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 6 (1988).
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as law."2 In order to be exempt from customary law, a nation must
object to the practice during its formation as custom. 123 Applying these
criteria to evidence of state practice and attitudes toward genocide, it
becomes clear that customary international law now permits an aggres-
sive outside response to governmental policies of genocide.
A. The International Impact of Genocide
Genocide generally has drastic effects outside the country where it
occurs. For example, genocide can produce thousands of refugees, plac-
ing an enormous strain on nearby countries.124 In addition, if the
targeted ethnic group constitutes the majority of the population of a
nearby country, that country is likely to be drawn into the conflict.125
This possibility is extremely likely in former Yugoslavia, where the vio-
lence could spread to the Albanian population in the former Yugoslav-
ian province of Kosovo, drawing Albania into the conflict.1 26 A substan-
tial number of Hungarians also reside in Croatia.1 2 7 Moreover, as the
West permits the situation to deteriorate, other Muslim nations are de-
manding much stronger action to protect Bosnian Muslims. 12 8 Cer-
tainly, genocide is capable of creating real international dangers. In
fact, the United Nations Security Council has found the situation in
122. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 15, § 102 cmt. d.
123. Id.
124. Thousands of Kurds poured into Turkey to escape Iraqi persecution, Miller,
supra note 107, and over two million refugees have fled the former Yugoslavia. Elliott,
supra note 10, at C4.
125. During the 1971 civil war in Pakistan, India acted with military force in
Pakistan to protect the Bengalis, with whom India had ethnic ties. Schachter, supra
note 116, at 1629. Vietnam invaded Cambodia to end the oppressive regime in that
country. KUPER, supra note 1, at 131. Burundi and Rwanda, both home to the warring
Tutsi and Hutu, have likely interfered in massacres occurring in both countries. See id.
at 153-55; Where's the Outrage over the Slaughter in Bloody Burundi?, CHI. TRIB.,
Aug. 28, 1988, at C3; Burundi Minister Speaks of Ethnic Genocide by Military,
REUTERS LIB. REP., Oct. 23, 1993, BC Cycle, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Wires File.
126. See generally Roger Cohen, Fear of the Serbs Spreads in the South, N.Y.
TIMES, May 30,. 1993, at 4(5). Michael W. Galligan et al., The Kosovo Crisis and
Human Rights in Yugoslavia, 46 REc. ASS'N B. CITY N.Y., 212, 236-57 (1991). For a
frightening discussion on the possibilities for the spread of war and violence, see Barry
James, Balkan States Choose Sides, Trying to Contain the Crisis, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Feb. 22, 1993.
127. The Eagle's Curse, supra note 26.
128. Ashraf Fouad, Moslem States Urge U.N. to Use Force in Bosnia, REUTERS
LIBR. REP., Dec. 3, 1992, BC Cycle, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
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Bosnia to constitute a threat to the peace.12' International efforts to
curb genocide before it spreads outside one nation's borders are justi-
fied by the reality of genocide's international consequences. 1 0
B. State Action
Nations have taken action outside their borders to end genocidal
policy or to punish perpetrators. For example, in 1978, Tanzania in-
vaded Uganda and ended Idi Amin's reign."" Although prompted by
an invasion of its own territory, Tanzania also justified its counter-inva-
sion of Uganda on humanitarian grounds.13 2 The action was approved
by the West, and the new Ugandan government was recognized by
many countries, including the United States. 33
Indian troops invaded Pakistan during Pakistan's civil war of 1971
in order to protect the Bengalis, with whom India had ethnic ties."
In 1979, the Vietnamese government invaded Cambodia and over-
threw the government of Pol Pot.13 5 The invasion was in response to the
harsh government policies of mass killings of the educated, separation
of families, and imposed migrations.136 The United Nations refused to
recognize the Vietnamese government, and the Pol Pot government re-
tained its seat in the General Assembly.137 Although the United Na-
tions maintained that its decision was based on the rejection of aggres-
sive intervention, politics probably played a larger role.'"
129. S.C. Res. 771, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3106th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/771
(1992); S.C. Res. 787, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3137th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/787
(1992). Once a matter reaches a point where it constitutes a threat to the peace, it no
longer remains within the domestic jurisdiction of the state. RAJAN, supra note 16, at
33.
130. The only example of action taken by the United Nations on this premise
occurred in the Congo. Id. at 153. However, in that situation, the United Nations was
invited to intervene by the Congolese government, and effectively took control of many
domestic matters to avoid civil war and maintain law and order. See id. at 142-60.
131. KUPER, supra note 1, at 226.
132. The President of Tanzania, Nyere, gave a speech indicating his desire to
overthrow Idi Amin because of the oppressiveness of his regime. CAROLYN THOMAS,
NEW STATES, SOVEREIGNTY, AND INTERVENTION 98-99 (1985).
133. Id. at 113. In Africa, only Nigeria and Sudan objected to the use of force
against Uganda. id. at 109.
134. Schachter, supra note 116, at 1629.
135. KUPER, supra note 1, at 131.
136. See id. at 130-31.
137. Id. at 136.
138. Id. at 90-91. The fact that Vietnam is a communist nation, as well as prior
U.S. involvement there likely played a role in Western refusal to recognize Vietnam as
the controlling government in Cambodia.
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When oil interests were involved, the United Nations approved
non-aggressive intervention in Iran to prevent the expected massacre of
the Bahd'i during the period between 1980 and 1982.111 Iran viewed
the BahA'i as "heretics, whose blood may be shed with impunity."' 4"
The 1979 Iranian Constitution recognizes only Christians, Jews, and
Zoroastrians as religious minorities, although the Bahd'i outnumber the
adherents of all those religions.141 The strong Bahd'i International
Community was able to persuade both the European Community and
the United Nations to pass resolutions condemning the persecution of
the Bahd'i in Iran and to monitor the situation. " ' International surveil-
lance may well have prevented the expected massacre, although some
persecution of the Bahd'i continues. " s
Finally, in August 1992, without the mandate of a United Nations
Resolution, the West began enforcing a no-fly zone in Iraq to protect
the Kurds.'" The trend of state practice, although sketchy, indicates
that severe human rights violations are international matters.
C. Opinio Juris
As far back as 1946, the French representative to the United Na-
tions Commission on Human Rights spoke for the majority opinion
when he said, "the question of human rights was a matter no longer of
domestic, but of international concern."45 The concept of universal ju-
risdiction was manifested in Israel's capture and trial of Adolf Eich-
mann, a Nazi war criminal. 4 6 The Israeli Supreme Court noted that,
"it is precisely the fact that the crimes in question and their effects
have extended to numerous countries that drains the territorial princi-
139. Id. at 163-64.
140. Id. at 152.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 163-64.
143. Id. at 164.
144. Jim Adams, U.S. Joins No-Fly Zone Against Iraq, REUTERS LIMITED, Aug.
26, 1992, AM Cycle, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File. The no-fly zones
were established to protect Shiites in the south and the Kurds in the north. Iraq's
alleged placement of anti-aircraft missiles near the no-fly zone, which endangered re-
connaissance planes, provoked the United States to militarily enforce the no-fly zone.
Highlights of Recent Disputes between Iraq and U.N., REUTERS, LTD., Jan. 12, 1993,
BC Cycle, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
145. G.A.O.R., 3rd Sess. Pt. I, 3rd Ctte., 57-58 quoted in RAJAN, supra note 16,
at 98-99.
146. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 15, § 404. Israel also assumed jurisdic-
tion on the principles of protective and passive personality. Attorney General of the
Government of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5, 10 (1968).
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pie of all content in the present case and justifies Israel in assuming
criminal jurisdiction by virtue of the 'universal' principle.1 14 7 Although
the world strongly condemned the kidnapping of Eichmann from his
home in Argentina as a violation of that nation's sovereignty, there was
no world claim that Israel lacked jurisdiction over Eichmann. 1"8 Israel's
position on universal jurisdiction is also reflected in the Restatement
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States."4" Most
recently, Germany is prosecuting a Bosnian Serb prison guard for aid-
ing and abetting genocide under a German law granting universal ju-
risdiction over war crimes. 150
More revealing is the changing interpretation of the phrase "threat
to the peace" by the United Nations. Once a situation is recognized as
a threat to the peace, by definition it is no longer a domestic matter.1 51
There are two opposing views on the scope of threats to the peace. The
strict view maintains that there must be an actual international
threat.15 The broader view would allow potential threats to be consid-
ered by the Security Council, with variable degrees of measures availa-
ble."' Considering that the main purpose of the United Nations is to
maintain peace and security, it is unreasonable to expect the United
Nations to remain silent until potential threats arising under domestic
jurisdiction expand across borders. 5
United Nations practice shows a tendency toward the broad view.
For example, in 1946 a subcommittee of the Security Council was able
to conclude only that Franco's fascist regime in Spain was a potential
menace to international peace and security. 15 Yet the subcommittee
still maintained that a potential menace was sufficient to accord the
matter international concern and fall under the Security Council's ju-
risdiction. 56 The General Assembly has found such broad matters as
disarmament, domestic development, and the increasing gap between
developing and developed states to be standing threats to the peace.157
147. Id. at 303.
148. Id. at 6.
149. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 15, § 404 reporters' notes 1.
150. ABC World News Tonight (ABC, Inc. Feb. 18, 1994) transcript available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Script File.
151. RAJAN, supra note 16, at 133.
152. Id. at 133-34.
153. Id. at 134.
154. Id. at 134-35. See also Delbruck, supra note 110, at 898-99.
155. RAJAN, supra note 16, at 12. The Soviet Union vetoed the subcommittee's
proposal. Id. at 12-13.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 135.
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Yet the United Nations has also acted with self-restraint. It did not
take action in the civil war in Pakistan "until the internal conflict was
internationalized by its spill over effects." 15 8
The recent trends in the United Nations indicate an opinio juris
that genocide is no longer a matter for domestic resolution. Although
not on the scale of genocide, apartheid, another human rights violation,
was considered by the United Nations a threat to international
peace. 159 The United Nations has stated that as a member of the
United Nations, South Africa could not claim that human rights viola-
tions addressed by the United Nations are domestic issues under article
2(7).160 The United Nations has deemed the Kurdish situation in Iraq
a threat to international peace and security,1 1 permitting the West to
use force within Iraqi borders to protect the Kurds.16 2 Not surprisingly,
the Security Council also has characterized the situation in the former
Yugoslavia as a threat to the peace. '
D. Resulting Customary Law
Evidence of state practice and attitudes reflects that a new princi-
ple of customary international law has emerged. Opinio juris declared
by Israel in the Eichmann case and by other nations through United
158. Id. at 193.
159. "Reaffirming that the policies and actions of the apartheid system constitute
a threat to international peace and security." G.A. Res. 34/93A, U.N. GAOR, 34th
Sess., Supp. No. 46 at 29, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979). See Delbruck, supra note 110,
at 894; Christiane Bourloyannis, The Security Council of the United Nations and the
Implementation of International Humanitarian Law, 20 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
335, 352 (1992).
160. Delbruck, supra note 110, at 893.
161. "Gravely concerned by the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many
parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish populated areas which led to a mas-
sive flow of refugees towards and across international frontiers and to cross border
incursions, which threaten international peace and security in the region." S.C. Res.
688, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2982nd mtg. at 31, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 (1991). See
Delbruck, supra note 110, at 894.
162. Chronology of Confrontation Between Iraq and West, REUTERS, LIMITED,
Jan. 13, 1992, BC Cycle, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
163. "Recognizing that the situation in Bosnia constitutes a threat to international
peace and security and that the provision of humanitarian assistance in Bosnia and
Herzegovinia is an important element in the Council's effort to restore international
peace and security in the area." S.C. Res. 771, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3106th mtg.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/771 (1992). "Reaffirming its determination that the situation in the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina constitutes a threat to the peace .... ." S.C. Res.
787, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3137th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/787 (1992)(resolution
authorizing the blockade).
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Nations resolutions on South Africa, Iraq, and Bosnia have demon-
strated a world belief that massive violations of human rights can as-
sume international implications. Foreign state involvement in Uganda,
Pakistan, Cambodia, Iran and Iraq has also demonstrated that outside
action can be an appropriate response to genocide. Opinio juris and
state action in this area strongly imply the emergence of a new princi-
ple of customary international law.' Sovereign states may no longer
validly claim that their grave violations of human rights are domestic
matters in which the rest of the world may not intervene.
E. Exemption by Dissent
Assuming that customary international law now recognizes the in-
ternational implications of genocide, Yugoslavia's dissent is not suffi-
cient to exempt itself from that principle. In order to opt out of emerg-
ing customary international law, a nation must object persistently from
the time the rule begins to emerge. 16 5 Although Yugoslavia has resisted
proposed action by the United Nations concerning genocide, it has
never clearly objected to the principle that genocide is an international
concern. Yugoslavia proposed deferment of consideration of the situa-
tion in Cambodia 60 and opposed a resolution calling on China to re-
spect the rights of the people in Tibet.16 7 However, Yugoslavia must
have objected consistently and clearly to avoid being bound by a princi-
ple. Instances where nations are not bound because of their past dissent
are historically rare.' 68 Although Yugoslavia has opposed action, it has
164. While there is an argument that the state action on this issue is too scarce,
many legal authorities maintain that opinio juris is more important than state practice
in determining the emergence of new humanitarian international law. MERON, supra
note 108, at 41-42, 246. Because of the unique circumstances in which human rights
violations occur, including the lack of deliberation and limited access for impartial
third parties, "the humanitarian conventions may have lesser prospects for actual com-
pliance than other multilateral treaties, even though they enjoy stronger moral sup-
port." Id. at 44. But see Weisburd, supra note 121, at 38-39. State practice is not
always representative of a State's attitude towards humanitarian international law.
There may be political reasons for avoiding intervention in massive human rights viola-
tions on the scale of genocide.
165. G.M. DANILENKO, LAW MAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 109
(1993).
166. KUPER, supra note 1, at 135-36.
167. Id. at 166.
168. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 15, § 102 cmt. d, reporters' note 2. The
Restatement provides two examples. Scandinavian states were permitted to retain a
four mile territorial sea, although only three miles was customary. Id., reporters' note
2. Also, Norway was able to delineate its territorial zone under a non-customary sys-
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not expressly dissented to the principle that grave violations of human
rights are international concerns. In fact, in 1947 Yugoslavia actually
supported Greek rebels, claiming that such support was justified by the
Greek persecution of Slavo-Macedonian minorities. 169 Yugoslavia also
voted for the resolution which characterized apartheid as a threat to
international peace. 170 Without clear objection, Yugoslavia is bound by
the development of this principle.
The situation in Bosnia is clearly a case of genocide, and arguably
threatens the international peace and security. Rump Yugoslavia,
bound by the principle that genocide is not a domestic affair, should
not be permitted to deter outside action by insisting that such action
constitutes impermissible intervention.
V. STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
An alternative approach to the issue of international involvement
in preventing genocide derives from the evolution of the doctrine of
non-intervention. Customary international law forbids intervention in
the domestic affairs of a sovereign nation.1 71 There have always been
exceptions to this doctrine,17 2 and recently some legal analysts have
proposed that humanitarian intervention is a new exception. 77 The ba-
sic theory of humanitarian intervention allows increasing levels of inter-
vention depending on the severity of the human rights violations.
17 4
Nevertheless, states are likely to be skeptical of this new theory out of
concern that someday their own sovereignty might be threatened by a
frivolous claim of human rights violation.
The development of international law has always been complicated
by the doctrine of state sovereignty. The concept of sovereignty as-
sumes absolute domestic authority. Intervention in the affairs of a sov-
ereign state is generally prohibited.17 5 This idea was codified in article
tem. Id.
169. Michael Akehurst, Humanitarian Intervention, in, INTERVENTION IN WORLD
POLITICS 95 (1984).
170. G.A. Res.00 34/93A, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46 at 29, U.N.
Doc. A/34/46 (1979).
171. Nanda, supra note 115, at 307. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar.
v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 108.
172. GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO PUB-
LIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 164-65 (1970), quoted in BARBARA HARFF, GENOCIDE AND
HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AND POLITICAL ISSUES 42-43 (1984). For
examples see infra notes 179-183 and accompanying text.
173. Nanda, supra note 115, at 309, 310.
174. Id. at 330.
175. Id. at 307.
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II of the United Nations Charter."O Intervention has been defined as
"dictatorial interference by one state in the affairs of another state for
the purpose of either maintaining or changing the existing order of
things, rather than mere interference per se." I" Intervention is "any
coercive attempt to usurp the decision-making capability of a theoreti-
cally sovereign state which does not originate within that state.'
' 78
The resulting doctrine of "non-intervention" has exceptions. For
example, a country may exercise any intervention rights granted to it in
a treaty.7 Intervention is also permissible as a response to violations of
recognized international law, and to violations of neutrality by belliger-
ents. 180 Collective enforcement actions by a community of nations is
also a form of permissible intervention.' 8' Finally, a nation may inter-
vene in the domestic affairs of another nation upon the invitation of the
receiving nation or as an act of self-defense.' 8 Some nations have also
asserted the right to intervene on behalf of the rights of their own na-
tionals. 8 ' Legal scholars argue that there is, or at least should be, an
exception for humanitarian intervention.'"
There are powerful policy arguments for allowing armed interven-
tion to alleviate the most serious of human rights violations. Failure on
the part of the international community to identify and prevent geno-
cide sets a poor precedent. Asserting that the world would not interfere
with his "final solution," Hitler once noted, "who, after all, speaks to-
day of the annihilation of the Armenians [during World War I]?"' 85
International law recognizes human rights violations as a crime, and
176. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 7.
177. VON GLAHN, supra note 172, at 163, quoted in HARFF, supra note 172, at
42.
178. THOMAS, supra note 132, at 21.
179. VON GLAHN, supra note 172, at 164-65, quoted in HARFF, supra note 172,
at 42-43.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. HARFF, supra note 172, at 43.
183. Nanda, supra note 115, at 309. Some examples of action to protect nationals
include the 1960 Belgian deployment of troops to the Congo shortly after it gained
independence; the 1964 rescue of hostages from the Congo by the United States and
Belgium; the 1976 Israeli rescue of Israeli hostages held by terrorists in Uganda; and
the 1980 attempt by the United States to rescue U.S. hostages held in Iran. Akehurst,
supra note 169, at 99-102.
184. See Schachter, supra note 116, at 1622. For a discussion of the argument see
supra note 125.
185. Vakahn N. Dadrian, Genocide as a Problem of National and International
Law: The World War I Armenian Case and Its Contemporary Legal Ramifications, 14
YALE J. INT'L L. 221, 225 (1989) (alteration added).
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crimes have little meaning unless sanctions for violations are enforced.
Obviously there are also important principles of morality and justice
which demand an outside response to the unspeakably immoral act of
genocide. Policy, however, is not law.
Even the universally recognized exceptions to non-intervention do
not permit the use of armed or "subversive" intervention.' 86 In 1965,
the United Nations General Assembly declared that "armed interven-
tion is synonymous with aggression ... and a violation of the Charter
of the United Nations."""7 The International Court of Justice has re-
jected the notion that there is any right of intervention, voicing a con-
cern that such a right "would be reserved for the most powerful states,
and might easily lead to perverting the administration of international
justice itself."1 88
Not even a "substantial minority" of United Nations members
have ever supported the validity of humanitarian intervention.' 8 9 De-
spite the history of forceful actions to stop massive human rights viola-
tions, there is no opinio juris of the United Nations or the Interna-
tional Court of Justice supporting humanitarian intervention.
Horrible as human rights violations are, the community of nations,
conscious of possible abuses and not willing to compromise each state's
absolute sovereignty, has not collectively embraced the idea of humani-
tarian intervention.1 90 Yet the United Nations has approved action to
protect the Kurdish population.19' A careful analysis of the resolution
reveals that the United Nations considered the Kurdish situation a
threat to international peace and security, and not an internal matter,
because of the flight of large numbers of Kurds into neighboring coun-
tries.1 92 Actions based on the recognition of the international conse-
186. Id.
187. HARFF, supra note 172, at 45.
188. Corfu Channel Case, 1949 I.C.J. at 35, quoted in Nanda, supra note 115, at
308-89.
189. Ian Brownlie, Humanitarian Intervention, LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE
MODERN WORLD, 217, 218-19 (1974).
190. Schachter, supra note 116, at 1629. See also KUPER, supra note 117, at 161.
[T]he sovereign territorial state claims, as an integral part of its sovereignty,
the right to commit genocide, or engage in genocidal massacres, against peo-
ples under its rule. . . . To be sure, no state explicitly claims the right to
commit genocide-this would not be morally acceptable even in international
circles-but the right is exercised under more acceptable rubrics, notably the
duty to maintain law and order, or the seemingly sacred mission to preserve
the territorial integrity of the state.
Id.
191. See supra note 161 for text. Bourloyannis, supra note 159, at 352.
192. Bourloyannis, supra note 159, at 352.
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quences of genocide are more attractive to the body of nations because
they do not erode national sovereignty as would another exception to
the doctrine of non-intervention. A theory that genocide is an interna-
tional matter is also in tune with United Nations practice, which con-
demns intervention, but recognizes that matters addressed by interna-
tional law are outside domestic jurisdiction.
VI. EVALUATION OF VARIOUS ACTIONS AND OPTIONS IN BOSNIA
Peaceful means to end the conflict have failed utterly in Bosnia, 193
and if the slaughter is to be stopped before the Muslim population is
destroyed, forceful measures are necessary. Only with a NATO ultima-
tum and threat of air strikes was the West able to bring about a period
of relative peace in Sarajevo. 194 The world's reluctance to act has not
only allowed genocidal acts by the Serbs to continue, but perhaps has
also encouraged the Croatians to adopt such tactics.'98 The United Na-
tions has already instituted a blockade to reduce the flow of arms into
the area.' NATO jets are patrolling a no-fly zone, although many
helicopters still fly over Bosnia without incident.1 97 Muslim nations,
however, are pushing for stronger measures including the use of ground
forces. 98 At the very least, the Muslim nations, and some voices in the
West, wish to lift the arms embargo for the Bosnian Muslims. 99
Evaluation of all of these options without some consideration of
the whole situation is rather artificial. Other factors to consider, beyond
the acts of genocide, include the presence of an actual armed conflict in
193. Kurt Schork, U.N. Says Humanitarian Solution Failing in Bosnia, REUTER
LIBR. REP., Jan. 7, 1993, BC Cycle, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
194. See John Pomfret, Deadline Passes Without Airstrikes: NATO, U.N. De-
clare Serbs Have Complied, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 1994, at Al, A22.
195. Nordland, supra note 12, at 48-49. Croatian nationalists, wearing ski masks
and shouting "let's kill the Muslims," entered the town of Stupni Do, raped and mas-
sacred the residents, and torched the buildings. Id. at 48.
196. S.C. Res. 787, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3137th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/787
(1991).
197. Kurt Schork, U.N. "Ignores" Helicopters in Bosnia No-Fly Zone, REUTER
LiBR. REP., Oct. 20, 1993, BC Cycle, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
198. Fouad, supra note 128.
199. Id. Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher strongly opposes the
present policy of denying arms to the Bosnian Muslims. William Drozdiak, Western
Anxiety Deepens Over Bosnian Crisis; Unappealing Options, Sense of Helplessness
Frustrate U.S. and Allied Leaders, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 1993, at A24. The United
States also tried to raise support for lifting the arms embargo. William Drozdiak, Al-
lies Still Balk at Air Strikes, Arms Aid: Despite Bosnian Serbs' Vote U.S. Finding
Consensus Elusive on How to Halt War, WASH. POST, May 7, 1993, at A29.
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progress, the world's recognition of Bosnia, and the "intervention" by
Serbia. The use of force is an extreme step to take. It is important to
justify such action under all available legal principles. The inclusion of
genocidal policies as justification for the international response may
also deter genocide in the future.
The Restatement of Law (Third) provides an overview of the use
of countermeasures against violations of international law.200 These
measures apply not only to treaty violations, but also to violations of
obligations erga omnes.2 0 1 Generally, the permissible measures include
freezing of assets and economic sanctions.2 02 The unilateral use of force
is limited by principles of necessity 03 and proportionality,20° as well as
by article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter.205 The only exception to
the prohibitions in the United Nations charter is in situations of self-
defense.2 0 6 The United Nations also possesses the power to call for a
collective use of force.20 7
United Nations peacekeepers have gone into various areas in for-
mer Yugoslavia to attempt to protect relief convoys and help refugees
reach relative safety.208 Although United Nations agents have territori-
ally entered former Yugoslavia, they do not present a threat to the ex-
isting sovereignty and are there pursuant to United Nations resolu-
tions.20 9 The United Nations relief efforts are welcomed by the Bosnian
Muslims, but do not challenge Serbian forces.
The sanctions thus far imposed have been restrained. As the world
first became aware of the seriousness of the situation, the United Na-
tions initiated an arms embargo. 10 On November 16, 1992, the United
200. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 15, § 905 cmt. a.
201. Id. Obligations erga omnes are those that are applicable to every state, in-
cluding human rights obligations under customary international law. Id. § 703 cmt. b.
202. Id. § 905 cmt. b.
203. Id. cmt. g.
204. Id.
205. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 4 states, "All Members shall refrain in their interna-
tional relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or politi-
cal independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of
the United Nations."
206. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 15, at § 905 cmt. g.
207. U.N. CHARTER Ch. VII, art. 42.
208. Schork, supra note 193. The United Nations efforts include rescuing Mus-
lims from besieged Srebrenica to the safer city of Tuzla. John Burns, Shelling Grounds
Bosnian Evacuation, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1993, at A3.
209. S.C. Res. 770, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3106th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/770
(1992).
210. S.C. Res. 713, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3009th mtg. at 42, 43, U.N. Doc. S/
INF/46 (1991).
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Nations, finding a definite threat to the international peace, authorized
the establishment of a blockade to enforce the arms embargo. " Nor-
mally blockades are an act of war; however, mere policing of a coast-
line is not necessarily considered an act of war.2 12 Limited pacific
blockades have been carried out in Rhodesia, Vietnam, and Cuba. 213
The blockade of Serbia is solely to reduce the flow of arms into the
region, enforcing a United Nations resolution 214 which imposes an arms
embargo on the area. The blockade of former Yugoslavia is also pursu-
ant to a United Nations resolution, 15 and the United Nations is au-
thorized to call for appropriate measures once it has identified a threat
to the international peace. 2
16
In October, 1992, the United Nations banned military flights over
Bosnia.21 7 The prohibition of Serbian flights over Bosnia does not vio-
late Serbia's sovereignty because Bosnia is not within Serbia's borders,
and all nations are forbidden from sending military flights over the
area. NATO is now authorized to patrol the air space to enforce the
no-fly zone.218 This action involves actual armed involvement within the
borders of Serbia. By this point, however, the claims of genocide have
been confirmed, and the international nature of the atrocities is appar-
ent. The threat to the international peace is undeniable and has been
declared by the Security Council.
The most controversial proposal concerns lifting the arms embargo
on Bosnia to allow arms shipments to the Bosnian Muslims who are
badly outmatched in weaponry.21 9 The most recent advocate of this
proposal is former British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher.2 0 The
legal nature of this proposal goes beyond discussions of intervention
and the international nature of genocide. Advocates insist the Bosnian
211. S.C. Res. 787, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3137th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/
787, annex T 9-12 (1992).
212. INGRID DETTER DELuPIs, THE LAW OF WAR 268 (1988).
213. Id. at 269-70.
214. S.C. Res. 713, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3009th mtg. at 42, 43, U.N. Doc. S/
INF/46 (1991).
215. S.C. Res. 787, U.N. SCOR., 47th Sess., 3137th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/
787, annex 9-12 (1992).
216. U. N. CHARTER Ch.. VII.
217. Anthony Goodman, U.N. Orders Ban on Military Flights Over Bosnia,
REUTERS, LIMITED, Oct. 10, 1992, PM Cycle, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Wires File.
218. See supra note 197, and accompanying text.
219. Fouad, supra note 128.
220. See Inside Parliament: Thatcher Casts her Shadow over Commons, INDE-
PENDENT, Apr. 15, 1993, at 6 (discussing the opposing views in Parliament on the issue
of lifting the arms embargo).
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Muslims have a right to self-defense.221 Self-defense is undeniably a
right under international law.222 The question is less obvious, however,
when the assistance of third parties is involved.
Nevertheless, it seems logical that the Bosnians should not have
less of a right to self-defense than those who are better armed. Well-
armed nations or groups are less likely to suffer attack. Under the cur-
rent circumstances, however, the right to self-defense is useless if aid is
not permissible. Furthermore, Serbia is unlikely to negotiate a peaceful
settlement as long as it has a clear military advantage.
Finally, the Arab nations are pushing for the ultimate interven-
tion, the introduction of ground forces.22 There can be no doubt that
this would be the most significant imposition upon state sovereignty,
and such intervention must be weighed against the necessity and pro-
portionality of the situation. The situation is most serious, having been
determined a threat to the peace by the Security Council. The realistic
possibility that the violence could spread to Macedonia, and involve
Greece and Turkey, two NATO powers, is of obvious international con-
cern. 2 4 Countless negotiated cease-fires have failed within days of be-
ing concluded. 225 Although Serbia and Croatia have agreed to a peace
agreement, Bosnian Muslims refuse to accept borders which allow the
Serbians to keep land they gained through aggression.22 It is not out-
rageous to suggest force is absolutely necessary to end the genocidal
events in Bosnia.
NATO is considering a plan which would send 50,000 troops into
Bosnia to enforce any plan agreed to by the Bosnians, Croats, and
Serbs. 227 However, these troops would serve at the invitation of
whatever governments may ultimately emerge in the Bosnian area, and
they would not subvert the sovereignty of those nations.
After more than two years of genocide and war crimes in Bosnia,
NATO finally took a more aggressive stance. After the world recoiled
at the single shell which killed almost 70 civilians in the marketplace in
Sarajevo, NATO issued an ultimatum backed by the threat of air
221. Id.
222. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
223. Fouad, supra note 128.
224. James, supra note 126.
225. Weller, supra note 35, at 598-601.
226. Bid to End Bosnian War is Defeated, ATLANTA J. AND CONST., Sept. 30,
1993, at A10.
227. Giles Elgood, Croat Soldiers in Sarajevo Face Tense Situation, REUTERS,
LIMITED, Sept. 25, 1993, PM Cycle, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
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strikes." 8 At the end of the time allotted to the Serbs to remove their
big guns from around Sarajevo or turn them over to U.N. control,
NATO backed off its threat, declaring the Serbs to be in "virtual com-
pliance."22 9 NATO claimed that its ultimatum led to peace in Sarajevo
and ultimately brought the war closer to an end. Unfortunately, the
Serbs merely made a show of reducing their guns around Sarajevo, and
got the additional benefit of welcoming their allies, the Russians, to the
scene. 30 Furthermore, other Bosnian cities remain under siege.231 A
blatant violation of the no-fly zone finally prompted NATO to engage
in its first military attack and down two Bosnian Serb planes.2 -2 Even
more aggressive, NATO attacked Serb positions outside the Moslem
city of Gorazde, earlier declared a "safe area" by the U.N. s While
NATO's statement explained that the bombing was in response to the
Serb's attack on the city of Gorazde in violation of a U.N. Security
Resolution, the threat to U.N military personnel and humanitarian aid
workers was the main impetus.2 4 Unfortunately, humanitarian viola-
tions and war crimes were not listed among the reasons for the attack.
It is possible that the new, more aggressive approach by NATO has
brought peace initiatives from mere posturing to a point where slow
progress is possible. 3
VII. CONCLUSION
The use of force should always be a last resort. Efforts at media-
228. Pomfret, supra note 194, at A22; Ruth Marcus, Clinton Can Claim Measure
of Success: U.S. Now Faces Question of Expanding Ultimatum to Other Cities, WASH.
POST, Feb. 21, 1994, at Al.
229. Pomfret, supra note 194, at Al.
230. Julijana Mojsilovic, Bosnian Serbs Celebrate Arrival of Russians, WASH.
POST, Feb. 21, 1994, at A19. Serbs shared brandy with the Russian peacekeepers who
greeted Serbian leader Karadzic with the Serb victory sign. Id.
231. See David B. Ottaway, Mostar's Muslims 'Living Like Rats': Besieged Bos-
nian Town Faces Conditions Like Those in Sarajevo, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 1994, at
Al.
232. Lancaster, supra note 11, at Al.
233. Jonathan C. Randal, U.S. Jets Strike Serb Forces Near Bosnian Town,
WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 1994, at Al.
234. Id.; John Lancaster, NATO's 'Neutrality' may be Early Casualty, WASH.
POST, Apr. 11, 1994, at Al.
235. The Bosnian Muslims and Croats have agreed on a federation proposal
which "creates a Bosnian state which can exist either independently or in confederation
with Croatia." John Pomfret, Emerging Balkan Peace Plan Could Be Wrenching,
WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 1994, at A12. The Croats have also reached a cease-fire agree-
ment with the Serbs. Serbs in Croatia Sign a Cease-Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1994,
at A10.
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tion, peaceful negotiations and settlement must be pursued vigorously.
Only when negotiations consistently fail, should the world community
realize the more extreme options legally available. A commitment to
armed enforcement of international law should not be taken lightly.
There are, however, certain violations of international law that are so
atrocious that the world should not hesitate to impose appropriate sanc-
tions. In the case of genocide, the most extreme of human rights viola-
tions, the world should reject the myth that the situation is not one of
international proportions.
In reality, the question of the legality of armed force in Bosnia has
not restrained any nation from acting in Bosnia. Certainly the United
States has acted swiftly for "humanitarian" reasons in Grenada and
Panama, cases with legal bases much less clear than this one."3 6 The
commitment to end the crisis in Bosnia is a costly one, and that cost
continues to grow. Earlier action might have curbed the inflammation,
but that was not to be. Legal options for an outside response are availa-
ble. It is up to the world, and especially Europe, to do some soul
searching. The world community must be committed to do what it
pledged to do after World War II, prevent and punish the perpetrators
of the ultimate crime of genocide. 7 By starting to characterize grave
human rights violations as threats to the peace, and not as matters
solely within the domestic jurisdiction of a nation, the world is moving
in the right direction.
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